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Abstract 
The paper examines the effect of economic determinant variables on voluntary taxpayer compliance among self-
employed individuals in Borno State, Nigeria. Survey research design was used in data collection. The paper 
used a sample of 105 self-employed taxpayers in Borno State, Nigeria who voluntarily comply. They were 
grouped into Major, Intermediate and Small. The paper discovered that the level of income and the imposition of 
penalties by the tax authority do not affect voluntary taxpayer compliance in the State. It that compliance would 
be easily increased if governments simply imposed more severe fines. This, however, is inconsistent with major 
theoretical and empirical studies. The paper recommends that further research in this area should include more 
economic variables and consider working with a larger sample by taking the whole of the population of this 
study and also including the unregistered self-employed individuals in the study area.  
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Introduction 
Tax compliance can be described as the degree to which a taxpayer obliges to tax rules and regulations. James 
and Alley (2004) indicated that tax compliance concept can be looked at from different perspectives. They 
defined tax compliance as the willingness of individual and other taxable entities to act in accordance with the 
tax laws. McBarnet (2003) identifies three forms of compliance, which include committed compliance, 
capitulative compliance and creative compliance. Committed compliance is the willingness to discharge tax 
obligations by taxpayer without grumbling. While capitulative compliance is the reluctant in discharging of tax 
obligations by taxpayer and creative compliance refers to any act by taxpayer aimed at reducing taxes by 
redefining income and  deductible expenditure within the confinement of the law.  
Studies have been devoted to the analysis of  tax compliance determinants as they are of paramount importance 
for tax levying, public spending, and providing public goods. Anderhub, Giese, Güth, Hoffmann and Otto (2001) 
focus on the influence of economic factors (tax rate, audit rate, income, penalty) on compliance behavior. Feld 
and Frey (2002) focus on the role of trust as a psychological contract between taxpayers and tax authorities. 
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Braithwaite (2003) identifies five motivational postures (commitment, capitulation, resistance, disengagement, 
game playing) which shape tax compliance behavior. Torgler (2003) supports the idea that tax morale (the 
intrinsic motivation to pay taxes), plays a key role in raising tax compliance levels.  
Kirchler (2007) provides a thorough description of the determinant variables of tax compliance, dividing them 
into three categories. His study states that there are socio-psychological determinants comprising attitudes, 
different types of norms, fairness perceptions, as well as motivational features relating to voluntary tax 
compliance; political determinants such as complexity of law and tax system, or fiscal policy; and economic 
determinants like the rational decision-making process and the effect of audit, fine, tax rate and income on tax 
behavior. 
Despite the arrangement put in place through tax system to ensure voluntary compliance with tax rules and 
regulations, the system is still facing numerous cases of tax noncompliance. Tax noncompliance is the failure of 
taxpayer to meet tax obligations whether the act is done intentionally or unintentionally (James & Alley, 2004). 
However, Kirchler (2007) argued that since degree of compliance varies then certain noncompliance might not 
violate the law. 
The growing concern of tax administrators throughout the world is on how to simplify the tax assessment system 
to encourage voluntary compliance and generate more revenue for the government (World Bank, 2011). Various 
State governments in Nigeria today are formulating strategies to improve revenue generation to adequately meet 
the challenges of increasing cost of government expenditure. In order to supplement the amount of revenue 
generation from the petroleum sector, the collection of income tax from self-employed persons which consist of 
individuals/sole traders, partnerships, professionals, communities and families still remain a great challenge. 
Self-employed persons are expected by law to collect Tax Assessment Form from the relevant tax authority and 
file the correct tax returns to government. If every self-employed person can perform his/her duty of filing tax 
returns, declaring all taxable income accurately  and payment of assessed taxes  to government as at when due, 
the problem of revenue generation will be minimized. 
The fall in the revenue accruable to State governments in Nigeria, occasioned by the falling crude oil price, has 
raised questions about the capacity of state governments at handling the multiplier effects of the fall. This has 
also raised another question on how the State government seeks to boost  the State economy. Contribution from 
Personal Income Tax (PIT) of self-employed persons and understanding the reasons that derive their decision to 
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comply remain a key challenge. Increase in the amount of tax revenue through taxpayers compliance will ensure 
that in the absence of oil, the State would remain self-sufficient and be able to cater for the needs of its people. 
This paper examines the effect of economic determinant variables on voluntary taxpayers compliance among 
self-employed persons in Borno State. To achieve this, the hypothesis “Economic determinant variables have no 
significant effect on  voluntary taxpayer compliance” was formulated. The paper covered voluntary taxpayer 
compliance among self-employed individuals who were registered with the of Borno State Board of Internal 
Revenue.  
Literature Review 
Kirchler (2007) defined tax compliance  as the most neutral term to describe taxpayers’ willingness to pay their 
taxes. Voluntary tax compliance is the ability and willingness of taxpayers to comply with tax laws, declare the 
correct income in each year and pay the right amount of taxes on time.   
McBarnet (2003) suggested tax compliance should be perceived in three ways, namely; Committed compliance 
(taxpayers’ willingness to pay taxes without complaint); Capitulative compliance (reluctantly giving  in and 
paying taxes); and Creative compliance (engaging to reduce taxes by taking advantage of possibilities to redefine 
income and deduct expenditures within the bracket of tax laws). Compliance might be voluntary or enforced 
compliance. Voluntary compliance is made possible by the trust and cooperation ensuing between tax authority 
and taxpayer and it is the willingness of the taxpayer on his own to comply with tax authority’s directives and 
regulations. However, in the presence of distrust and lack of cooperation between authority and taxpayer, which 
creates tax hostile climate, authorities can enforce compliance (Kirchler, 2007). The manner in which taxpayers 
are treated in the course of the provision of tax service has impact on their compliance behavior (Feld & Frey, 
2006). 
Torgler (2007) argued taxpayers’ willingness to cooperate with tax authority will increase, if the authority sees 
itself as service institution and providing quality service and treating the taxpayers as partners. OECD (2007) 
equally submitted that delivery of quality of service to taxpayers will strengthen their willingness to comply with 
tax rules and regulation voluntarily as result will contribute to overall level of tax compliance. Tax enforcement 
aspects like penalties and the probability of detection also relate to tax compliance while other labour market 
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behaviour factors including an individual’s wages and tax bracket also contribute to tax compliance (Kirchler, 
2007).  
Feld and Frey (2002) have attributed the response of voluntary compliance to a set of intrinsic motivation or 
attitude often referred to as tax morale. Tax morale emphasizes the taxpayers internal motivations, social norms, 
personal values, cognitive processes and sense of moral obligation to pay taxes can help to explain the 
motivation for voluntary tax compliance. Thus positive morale maysignal higher voluntary compliance while 
negative morale will signal  lower voluntary compliance.  
Determinants of  Voluntary Taxpayer Compliance 
According to Wang and Conant (1988), generally taxpayers’ decisions to comply (or not comply) are determined 
directly by the complexity of the tax system, taxpayers’ confidence in government, taxpayers’ perception of 
fairness of the entire tax system, the social setting and societal norms, the effectiveness of tax authorities, and the 
effective tax rate to enhance shareholder value. Wang and Conant (1988) concluded that taxpayers’ confidence is 
largely dependent on the efficiency and efficacy of government services, the perceived level of fraud and 
corruption in the government and whether government is serious in combating fraud and corruption. 
Gilligan and  Richardson (2005), the tax system that is perceived as unfair by the citizens may likely be less 
successful and this will encourage the taxpayers to engage in noncompliance behavior. The literature indicates 
that government regulators can benefit by employing fair procedures, it has been shown that taxpayers are 
generally more compliant when they think they have been treated fairly by tax authority. 
The theoretical and empirical studies reported that tax compliance behavior is as complex as taxpayer’s 
personality  (Chan, Troutman, & O’Bryan, 2000; Trivedi, Shehata & Mestelmen, 2004). Determinant variables 
which influence the decision to voluntarily comply include the socio-psychological determinants (attitudes and 
norms), political determinants (complexity of law and fiscal policy), and the economic variables (penalty and 
income). Therefore to increase tax compliance, there is the need to examine the variables which have effect on 
the individual taxpayer’s behavior. 
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Economic Determinants of Tax Compliance    
The classical economic model of tax evasion assumes that audit probability, fines, tax rates and income there are 
four different determinant variables that shape taxpayers’ behaviour. According to the model, tax evasion 
decreases when audit probability and fines increase, because the expected utility of evasion mitigates as well. As 
for the other two parameters, their increase leads to ambiguous results concerning compliance. Lin and Yang 
(2001) also predicts a negative influence of tax rate on compliance provided the taxpayers are able to determine 
their desired level of compliance.       
According to the traditional model of tax compliance, taxpayers choose how much income to report on their tax 
return by solving a standard expected utility-maximization problem that trades off the tax savings from 
underreporting true income against the risk of audit and penalties for detected noncompliance (Allingham & 
Sandmo, 1972). In this framework, both the threat of penalty and audit make people pay their taxes.  
Fagbemi, Uadiale and Noah (2010), found that it is prevalent in developing countries and it hinders development 
thereby leading to economic stagnation and other socio-economic problems. Chipeta (2002) identified tax rates 
as one of the causes of tax evasion. He pointed out that a higher tax rate increases taxpayers’ burden and reduces 
their disposable income therefore, the probability of evading tax is higher. 
According to Anyanfo (1996), Faculty theory states that one should be taxed according to the ability to pay. This 
is the most popular and commonly accepted principle of equity or justice in taxation in which citizens of a 
country are expected to pay taxes to the government in accordance with their ability to pay. It appears very 
reasonable and just that taxes should be levied on the basis of the taxable capacity of an individual. An average 
individual feels that income should be the basis of measuring a man’s ability to pay.  
 
Methodology 
Data collection was carried out using survey research design. The paper considered self-employed individuals in 
Borno State, Nigeria. There were 1250 registered self-employed individuals with the Borno State Board of 
Internal Revenue who were grouped into Major, Intermediate and Small. Each of these groups have different 
level of compliance and contribution to the total revenue of the State. The Major group comprising of 200 
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registered self-employed individuals pay above N100,000 per annum in taxes. 250 registered self-employed 
individuals constituting the Intermediate group pay between N50,000 and N100,000 per annum in taxes. The 
remaining 800 registered self-employed individuals categorized as Small pay below N50,000 per annum in 
taxes.  
This study considered only voluntarily complying self-employed individuals within these three groups. Thus 
20% of the population of the Major group, 10% of the population of the Intermediate group, and 5% of the 
population of the Small group are self-employed taxpayers who voluntarily comply within each group in the 
State. The sample size amounted to a total of one hundred and five (105) respondents, about 8.4% of the 
population. See Table 1. 
Table 1: Sampling Frame 
GROUP TAX PAYABLE 
PER ANNUM    
NUMBER OF TAXPAYERS 
IN EACH GROUP 
(POPULATION) 
COMPLIANCE LEVEL IN  
PERCENTAGE (%) 
COMPLYING 
INDIVIDUALS 
(SAMPLE SIZE) 
RETRIEVED 
Major Above   N100,000 200 20 40 30 
Intermediate N50,000-N100,000 250 10 25 17 
Small Below   N50,000 800 5 40 33 
Total  1250 35 105 80 
Source: Field survey, 2015 
Questionnaires were administrated to the one hundred and five (105) respondents, out of which eighty (80) were 
retrieved. The remaining twenty-five (25) respondents in the sample either did not responded to the research 
instrument or completed the instrument inadequately. The questionnaire design developed by Evans, Carlon and 
Massey (2005) was adopted. Five-point Likert-style rating scale was employed in  collecting  the views of 
respondents.The dependent variable in this study is represented by voluntary taxpayer compliance while the 
independent variables are represented by socio-psychological determinant (norms and attitude). 
Analysis 
Penalty as an economic determinant variable had the highest mean score of 3.31 and standard deviation of 1.176; 
followed by the influence of tax authority tolerance and lack of punishment on voluntary compliance with a 
mean of 3.16 and a standard deviation of 1.247; taxpayers’ income on compliance with a mean 2.60 of and 
standard deviation of 1.279; and severity of sanctions with a mean of 2.28 and standard deviation of 1.340  
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Frequencies Relating to the Research Variables     
 Source: Field survey 2015 
Key: M = Mean, STD = Standard deviation, SA = Strongly Agree, A = Agree, U = Undecided, D = Disagree,  
SD = Strongly Disagree and TR= Total Response 
Test of Hypothesis  
The study used a single regression model to test the relationship between voluntary tax compliance and 
economic factors. The model was depicted thus: 
VC = β0 + β1 E + ε 
Where VC is voluntary compliance  
             β0  is  the intercept,    
             β1 is the coefficient of the economic factor 
             β0  is  the intercept,    β1 – β3 are coefficients and ε  is the error 
              E is the Economic factor                                                                
              ε  is the error 
The result of the regression is shown in Table 3. The coefficient  Economic determinant (E) is not significantly 
different from 0 using an alpha level of 0.05 because its P-value of  0.934 is greater than 0.05. The result shows 
that Economic determinant is not statistically significant in the model, consequently, the hypothesis that 
economic determinant (E) does not significantly affect voluntary tax compliance is not rejected. This implies that 
economic determinants (income and penalty) do not significantly affect voluntary taxpayer compliance. Income 
and Penalty  are found not to be determinant factors affecting taxpayers voluntary compliance in the study area. 
Statements M STD SA A U D SD TR 
Economic determinants:         
i. The severity of sanctions and penalties ensure 
voluntary compliance among self-employed persons. 
2.28 1.340 30 
35.5% 
24 
30.0% 
7 
8.8% 
12 
15.0% 
7 
8.8% 
80 
100% 
ii. Taxpayers wish not to comply because they feel 
penalty rates are very low and they can afford to pay 
the penalty. 
 
3.31 1.176 6 
7.5% 
15 
18.8% 
20 
22.5% 
26 
32.5% 
13 
13.8% 
80 
100% 
iii. If detected not reporting the exact income, the tax 
authority is tolerant towards such offence and most 
probably one will escape without punishment. 
 
3.16 1.247 10 
12.5% 
15 
18.8% 
18 
22.5% 
26 
32.5% 
11 
13.8% 
80 
100% 
iv. Financial position (income) is a significant factor 
that influence taxpayer’s decision to deliberately 
complete tax return inaccurately. Therefore, fail to 
comply 
2.60 1.279 20 
25.0% 
21 
26.3% 
16 
20.0% 
17 
21.3% 
6 
7.5% 
80 
100% 
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 Table 4.10: H02: Economic determinants have no significant effect on  voluntary taxpayer compliance 
Model b SE-b Beta Sig, 
Economic (E) .563 .442 .622 .934 
Source: SPSS Version 20 Outcome 
Discussion of Findings  
The result of the hypothesis reveals economic determinants, which is statistically insignificant at 5% with a P-
value of 0.934, was not rejected. This explains that income of and imposition of penalty on self-employed 
persons do not influence voluntarily compliance. Taxpayers choose how much income to report on their tax 
returns by solving a standard expected utility-maximization problem that trade off the tax savings from 
underreporting true income against the risk of  fines for detected noncompliance. Based on the results predicted 
by this economic  model, one could state that compliance would be easily increased if governments simply 
imposed more severe fines. Nevertheless, the theoretical and empirical studies departed from this and state that 
compliance cannot be increased easily by severe sanctions. The identified inconsistencies called for refinements 
of this model and inclusion of other variables. 
 Conclusion 
This paper conludes that the level of income of self-employed persons and the imposition of penalties by the tax 
authority do not affect voluntary taxpayer compliance in the State. It concludes that self-employed persons opt 
for strategies that yields the highest expected utility under uncertainty conditions, therefore try to evade taxes. 
This study indicated that, compliance through the willingness of self-employed individuals to pay tax is very 
important and cannot be ignored. The paper recommends that further research in this area should include more 
economic variables and consider working with a larger sample by taking the whole of the population of this 
study and also including the unregistered self-employed individuals in the study area.  
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